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The U.S. Constitution did not come with a glossary defining its
terms. In breathing life into words such as "search" and "seizure," the
U.S. Supreme Court has been forced to look beyond the text of the
Fourth Amendment.' In a progeny including Boyd,2 Olmstead,3 and
Katz,4 the Court has outlined and re-outlined the parameters of a
search based on values not addressed in the Fourth Amendment such
as tenets of property law,5 and common law torts including trespass6
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1. See Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 27 (1988). The Fourth Amendment reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. "Under Boyd, the Constitution allows an invasion of an individual's privacy only if such
an invasion is consistent with the rules of property law." Ken Davis, Washington Constitution
Article I, Section 7: The Argument for Broader Protection Against Employer Drug Testing, 16 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1993) (citations omitted).
6. Olmstead is based on a notion of trespass. See Michael Campbell, Comment, Defining
a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH.
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and invasion of privacy.7 Such demarcations are important to protect
people against violations of their constitutional rights because
governmental activities that are not deemed to be a "search" by Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence fall outside federal constitutional protec-
tion.'
The U.S. Constitution identifies and prohibits inappropriate
governmental behavior. By doing so, it outlines the lowest common
denominator of rights afforded to U.S. citizens. The principles of
federalism, however, allow states to craft and interpret constitutions to
provide state citizens a level of civil liberties equal to or greater than
that afforded by the U.S. Constitution.'
While many state constitutions mirror the language of the U.S.
Constitution, Washington constitution is unique. In 1889, three years
after the Supreme Court decided Boyd, 10 the Washington State
Constitutional Convention met to craft its own state constitution.
While little is known about the convention itself," it is clear that the
delegates expressly rejected the language of the Fourth Amendment, 2
and in its place drafted Article I, section 7, which reads, "No person
L. REV. 191, 193 (1986).
7. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz asks whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy is breached. While it is true that the Katz Court expressly rejected the notion that the
case was based upon privacy, it has been widely regarded as such. See Anthony Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974).
8. See id. at 388.
9. See Robert Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1025, 1042 (1985). ("[Sltate constitutions grant affirmative rights to citizens while the federal
constitution acts as a limitation on federal government."). A good example of this policy in action
lies in Washington v. Chrisman where the United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Court's holding that an officer's entry and search of two students' dormitory room
violated the Fourth Amendment. 455 U.S. 1 (1982). Upon remand, the Washington court had
the final word since the court decided the case on state grounds, rendering it unreviewable in light
of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See Washington v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814,
815, 676 P.2d 419, 421 (1984). See also discussion of Michigan v. Long, infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
10. Some believe that Article I. section 7 is based in part on the Boyd decision. See Sanford
E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule
Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 520 (1986)
("The unique language chosen by the framers from Article I, section 7 created a broad and
inclusive privacy protection that directly reflects the Boyd theory of privacy."). See also Davis,
supra note 5, at 1346.
11. Commentators bemoan the fact that there were few historical sources to provide insight
into the framer's intent. See Pitler, supra note 10, at 520 n.316; Davis, supra note 5, at 1351 &
n.97.
12. See George Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 332 (1985) (citing THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 497 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962)).
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shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."' 3
Interestingly, although the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
section 7 share only five words in common, 4 the two passages were
interpreted identically by the Washington courts for over ninety
years." Perhaps spawned in part by the United States Supreme
Court's recent contraction of citizen's rights, 6 and Michigan v.
Long,'7 in which the U.S. Supreme Court warned that it would now
be free to accept a state case unless the state court explicitly based its
holding on adequate and independent state grounds, the Washington
Supreme Court rediscovered the uniqueness of Article I, section 7 in
a series of cases culminating in State v. Myrick."8
In Myrick, the court officially recognized the greater protection
afforded by Article I, section 7, and expressly rejected the Katz two-
prong definition of a search.' 9 However, Myrick failed to clearly
identify a concrete test to fill the void left by Katz. In the wake of
Myrick, Washington lower courts drifted about, confused as to the
appropriate standard to apply in defining a search. This Article
proposes that Myrick was correct in recognizing the ingenuity of
Article I, section 7, and in rejecting the Katz definition. Unfortu-
nately, the holding of Myrick did not go far enough in articulating a
replacement for the Katz test. In the hope of providing an anchor for
the Washington courts,20 this Article offers a proposed test that
encompasses the spirit and language of Article I, section 7, Myrick, and
Myrick's recent progeny. By sewing together the essential themes from
13. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
14. The five words are: "No," "be," "in," "or," and "of," as explained in Nock, supra note
12, at 331.
15. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 197, 622 P.2d 1199, 1215 (1980) (Horowitz,
J., dissenting).
16. See Nock, supra note 12, at 333 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)).
17. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Justice Utter, the author of State v. Myrick, was undeniably
aware of the importance of Michigan v. Long since he referred to it in his article as one
explanation as to why state courts decide cases based on state rationales. See Utter, supra note
9, at 1026.
18. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
19. See id. at 510-11, 688 P.2d at 154.
20. The notion that a court has left the state of the law with "all sail and no anchor" comes
from an article similarly titled referring to California state law. See George Deukmejian and
Clifford Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution,
6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 975 (1979) (as cited in William Jennison, Comment, Privacy in the
Can: State v. Boland and the Right to Privacy in Garbage, 28 GONZ. L. REV. 159, 165 n.54
(1992)). It is from this metaphor that this Article is named.
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these sources, the proposed test embodies the Washington Supreme
Court's intent in defining Washington's unique parameters of a search.
Section II examines Myrick itself, including the Washington
Supreme Court's path that led to that decision, the facts of the case, its
reasoning, and its holding. Section III discusses the reaction to and
effects of Myrick, including the seemingly disingenuous and inconsis-
tent cases that have followed Myrick. Section IV outlines a proposal
that more precisely defines a search in Washington, discussing the
sources of the proposed test, examining how it would help guide
Washington courts, and explaining which cases would be decided
differently using the proposed standard.
II. STATE V. MYRICK
A. The Road to Myrick
The Washington Supreme Court did not jump head first into the
Myrick decision. Instead, it slowly tested the waters, gaining courage
during the six years prior to the decision. State v. Hehman2" is
considered the Washington Supreme Court's first modem,22 albeit
small, step in the direction of its own search and seizure jurispru-
dence. 3 In Hehman, the court held that a full custody arrest for a
minor traffic offense was an unreasonable seizure under the Washing-
ton Constitution where the defendant is willing to sign a promise to
appear in court." The Hehman decision contradicted earlier Supreme
Court decisions holding that searches incident to an arrest were valid
under the Fourth Amendment.2" The Hehman court begged the
question of the validity of the searches incident to an arrest, concluding
instead that the arrest itself was unlawful.26
Most notably, the Hehman court distinguished the contrary
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court noting that "[s]uch decisions, do
not limit the right of state courts to accord to defendants greater
rights."27  Perhaps most telling of how significant the Hehman
21. 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978).
22. According to Nock, supra note 12, at 332, for a period after the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Washington Supreme Court
cited Article I, section 7 in its decisions. Following the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), however, this practice quickly ended. See Nock supra note 12, at 332.
23. See Nock, supra note 12, at 333.
24. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 47, 578 P.2d at 528.
25. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
26. See Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 50, 578 P.2d at 529.
27. Id. at 49, 578 P.2d at 529.
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decision was in opening the door to a separate Washington search and
seizure doctrine, was the reaction of dissenting Justice Brachtenbach:
"Under the majority ruling the officer almost needs an appellate court
riding [in] his patrol vehicle to advise [him] of the changing nature of
the rules. "28
The next case to address Washington's search and seizure doctrine
was State v. Simpson.29  Simpson concerned the so-called automatic
standing rule presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in State v.
Salvucci.3 ° In Simpson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
holding of United States v. Salvucci and concluded that Article I,
section 7 mandated the existence of an automatic standing rule that
allows defendants to assert a violation of privacy as a result of
impermissible police conduct without having such assertion used
against them as evidence of their possession of illegal contraband.3
Citing Hehman, the Washington court noted the greater protection
offered by the Washington Constitution, and more importantly,
attributed this greater protection to Article I, section 7.32
Dissenting Justice Horowitz was not convinced. In his dissenting
opinion he wrote, "Article I, section 7 . . . affords defendants
protection identical to that of the federal Fourth Amendment."33 He
continued, "The majority does not explain why this state provision was
subjected to interpretation identical to that given the Fourth Amend-
ment during its first 91 years of its existence in our state constitu-
tion."34 Finally, Justice Horowitz ominously warned that the majority
"has opened the door to independent interpretation of Article I, section
7 of our state constitution without providing any guidelines for the use
of this new tool of constitutional analysis."3  In the wake of the
Myrick decision, Justice Horowitz has been proven correct.
Following Hehman and Simpson, the Washington Supreme Court
applied these holdings to expand Washington citizens' civil liberties
28. Id. at 51, 578 P.2d at 530 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
29. 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
30. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
31. See Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 181, 622 P.2d at 1206.
32. See id. at 178, 622 P.2d at 1205. It is interesting to note that the court engaged in a
Katz-type analysis in deciding that Simpson had a subjective and objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in his vehicle identification number. It was not until Myrick, decided four
years later, that this type of analysis was rejected. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d
at 154.
33. Id. at 196, 622 P.2d at 1215 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 197, 622 P.2d at 1215 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 202, 622 P.2d at 1218 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
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regarding the use of informant's tips,36 the "plain view" doctrine,37
and the good faith doctrine.3" However, the court failed to define a
search under the newly discovered expansive Article I, section 7 until
the Myrick decision.
B. The Facts of Myrick
Edward Myrick owned eighty acres of property in a heavily
wooded area which precluded casual observation.39 In addition to his
land's natural borders, Myrick constructed a fence surrounding the
property, posted several "No Trespassing" signs, installed electronic
sensors, and built an observation platform to detect intruders.40
Acting on an anonymous tip that Myrick was growing marijuana on
the property, the police borrowed a plane from the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, and from an altitude of 1,500 feet, observed with
the naked eye what turned out to be approximately 500 marijuana
plants." Based upon the observations from the plane and the
information from the informant, the police obtained a warrant to search
Myrick's land.42
Using Katz's "legitimate expectation of privacy" test, the trial
court held that the search from the plane was valid since Myrick did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance.43
Myrick was ultimately convicted of manufacture and possession of
marijuana.44 Myrick appealed his conviction asserting that the aerial
search violated his privacy rights under Article I, section 7.45
36. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). In Jackson, the court
agreed with the Aguilar/Spinelli test requiring the showing of both the informant's reliability and
the informant's basis of personal knowledge. See Nock, supra note 12, at 341. Note that
currently the United States Supreme Court requires only the "totality of circumstances"
requirement as outlined in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
37. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). See discussion supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
38. See State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). The White court concluded
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was unworkable under Article I, section 7
since the court rejects the premise that the exclusionary rule is merely remedial. See id. at 106,
640 P.2d at 1061.









C. Reasoning and Holding of Myrick
When Myrick reached the Supreme Court of Washington, Justice
Utter4 6 noted the steps taken in Hehman and Simpson, especially the
recognition that Article I, section 7 provides greater protection to
Washington citizens than the Fourth Amendment provides to citizens
generally.4 7  The court acknowledged that although states may look
to the U.S. Supreme Court's search and seizure jurisprudence for
guidance, ultimately each state draws upon its own legal foundations
to determine the scope and effect of its constitution.48
To determine whether a search necessitating a warrant had taken
place, the Myrick court noted that "the inquiry [under the Fourth
Amendment] is whether the defendant possessed a 'reasonable
expectation of privacy."' 49  The court focused on the difference
between Washington's Article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment:
"due to the explicit language of Const. art. I, sec. 7, under the
Washington Constitution the relevant inquiry ... is whether the state
unreasonably intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs."' 50
For the first time, the court articulated two different inquiries.
While the Katz two-part test asked whether the defendant exhibited
an actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy,51 the Myrick court
noted that Article I, section 7 was not concerned with such a require-
ment. The court explained that the protection under Article I, section
7 was not confined to the subjective privacy expectations of Washing-
ton citizens who were learning to expect diminished privacy in many
46. Justice Utter authored a law review article that provides some insight into his
motivations in crafting Myrick. See Utter, supra note 9. In the article, he discussed Michigan v.
Long, and the emerging need for state courts to explicitly base decisions on adequate and
independent state grounds. See Utter, supra note 9, at 1026. Justice Utter also noted the use of
states as laboratories for testing new ideas of jurisprudence. See id. at 1043.
47. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 153.
48. See id. It is clear that Justice Utter was well aware of the Long case, as indicated in his
article. See Utter, supra note 9, at 1026. In fact, the court was no stranger to this notion as
evidenced by the Chrisman decision. See discussion supra note 9.
49. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 153. The "reasonable expectation ofprivacy"
test is actually derived from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1976) (Harlan, J., concurring). That two-prong test (subjective and objective
expectations of privacy) was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court as the official test to determine
if a search had taken place in Rakas v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
50. Id., 688 P.2d at 154.
51. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Harlan, J., concurring). Note that Justice Harlan himself
actually felt this prong was useless, and in fact, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately did not
consider the prong as a necessary element. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 384. In addition,
the Washington Supreme Court was not the first to find fault in this first prong. See id.; see also
infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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aspects of their lives due to "well publicized advances in technolo-
gy. "52 Rather, Article I, section 7 focused on those privacy interests
Washington citizens held in the past, and more importantly it focused
on those privacy interests that Washington citizens should be entitled
to hold in the future, safe from warrantless searches.
53
This "should be entitled to hold" concept is ingenious. Even if
no subjective or objective expectation of privacy existed, a court can
label a certain intrusion into a person's private affairs as a search,
thereby requiring a search warrant.54
The court distinguished the federal "open fields" doctrine outlined
in Oliver v. United States, which states that open fields (land beyond
the curtilage of the home) are not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection from searches and seizures since individuals cannot hold a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field. 5 The court boldly
explained that in direct contrast to Oliver, "the language of Const. art.
I, § 7 precludes a 'protected places' analysis and mandates protection
of the person in his private affairs.""6
52. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
53. See id.
54. An example may help identify the significance of this "should" language. Suppose, for
example, that Washington authorities decided that because of the increased use of cellular
telephones in criminal activity, all cellular calls would be monitored for one month. Suppose
further that before such surveillance took place, all cellular telephone owners and users were
notified of the impending month-long surveillance. Subjectively, an individual could not claim
an expectation of privacy in using the cellular telephone during the month. Furthermore,
objectively, society would not recognize that expectation of privacy as reasonable, based upon the
notifications. Applying the Katz test, the surveillance would not constitute a search. The
ingenuity of the "should" language, however, is that it allows Washington court to step in and
decide that even though there exists no subjective or reasonable objective expectation of privacy
in the calls for that month, such calls should qualify as an individual's private affairs, and any
surveillance of such should, and therefore does, constitute a search.
55. 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
56. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155. It is interesting to note the similarity
of this passage to the oft criticized language of Katz which asserted, "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, Search, Seizure, and Surveillance, in
Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1969). Professor Taylor claims that
the only merit in the passage is in its brevity. Id. at 112.
Much of the criticism of the Katz passage, however, concerns its incompleteness, in that it
ignores the relevance of the places analysis inherent in determining the reasonableness of an
individual's expectation of privacy. For example, if two individuals were performing the exact
same activities, however one was in a public park and the other in his basement, the locations of
the individuals would certainly be a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of their
respective expectations of privacy. Of course, if the Katz passage was only meant to imply that
location itself is not determinative, then the open fields per se doctrine is directly contradictory
to such a statement. In contrast, the Washington court recognized that location is not
determinative, and therefore added, "[T ]he question of whether all warrantless aerial surveillance
violates Const. art. I, § 7 is not answered by looking at the nature of the property alone. This is
but one factor... " Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
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Finally, after an expansion of privacy interests under Washing-
ton's constitution, the court abruptly concluded that since the fields
were identifiable by the officer's unaided eye from a lawful and
nonintrusive vantage point, the aerial surveillance of Myrick's
marijuana plants did not constitute a search under Article I, section
7.7 Unfortunately, the court did not comment on which of the three
factors was determinative: the officer's unaided eye, his lawful vantage
point, or his nonintrusiveness.
III. THE EFFECTS OF MYRICK
A. Initial Reaction to Myrick
In an article written just after the Myrick decision, Professor
George Nock wrote, "The Washington Supreme Court's carefully
articulated reliance on the difference [between the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, section 7] is a welcome sign of the court's willingness to
relate analysis of section 7 to its textual provisions. The rule fashioned
by the court [in Myrick], however, is not particularly helpful.""8
Nock explained that the court failed to identify those privacy interests
that citizens have held or should be entitled to hold. Without
providing a mechanism to identify these interests, Nock maintained,
the rule is a tautology.5 9 Nock concluded that Myrick provided little
guidance, and, at the time the article was written, he was not convinced
that Article I, section 7 would provide the mechanism to offer any
substantive departures from federal search and seizure jurisprudence. 0
This conclusion is similar to Justice Horowitz's fear as expressed
in the Simpson dissent.6 Horowitz recognized the danger inherent in
awaking the sleeping giant of Article I, section 7 without providing
clear instructions on its use. Aware of Justice Horowitz's warning,
why is it that the court left Myrick without any greater guidance for its
future use? Professor Anthony Amsterdam, writing decades before
Myrick, offers one explanation as to why monumental decisions such
57. See id.
58. Nock, supra note 12, at 345.
59. See id. Note the similarity of this criticism to that offered by Amsterdam in reference
to the Katz test where he explained, "[Iln the end, the basis of the Katz decision seems to be that
the Fourth Amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim Fourth Amendment
protection." Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 385.
60. See id. at 346.
61. See supra Part II.A.
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as Myrick often do not go quite far enough in articulating a clear,
"coherent analytical framework. '62
Courts, Amsterdam points out, are made up of a committee of
members. 63  Rare is the legal opinion which unites every member of
the committee in both its holding and every part of its reasoning.64
The result of the committee process is often an opinion of the court
that is a series of accommodations and compromises. 6 The Myrick
decision undoubtedly suffered a similar fate. While there is no direct
evidence indicating conflicting negotiations between the Justices in
deciding this case, there is certainly circumstantial evidence which
points to it. Most notably, the reasoning of Myrick advances a separate
and expansive notion of privacy rights for Washington citizens, while
the holding itself (finding the search of an open field constitutional) is
synonymous with its federal counterpart. 66  The judicial tug-of-war
that may have preceded the Myrick decision provides some insight into
why the decision fails to provide a perfectly lucid analytical frame-
work.67
Without this concrete framework, the Washington Supreme Court
and the lower courts were faced with the unpleasant task of attempting
to formulaically apply a nonformulaic theory. Namely, while the
Washington courts knew that they needed to rely on Myrick as it was
the seminal case defining a search in Washington, they each had their
own ideas about what Myrick stood for, or what Myrick required the
outcome of a particular case to be. As the following two sections
identify, both the Washington Supreme Court and the lower courts
have drifted about in applying the "Myrick framework." An overview
of the cases that have attempted to interpret Myrick reveals that for
each court opinion that made a step forward in positively defining the




65. While it is true that both concurring and dissenting opinions are available options for
the disgruntled Justice, in building a majority or in attempting to show uniformity through a
unanimous opinion of the court, often times the majority opinion becomes the object of negotia-
tion.
66. Other evidence is the fact that the Washington Supreme Court decisions that followed
Myrick fall in very different directions from each other. See discussion infra Part III.B. This may
indicate that Myrick itself was a compromise of competing ideologies.
67. Amsterdam offers two other possible rationales for a less-than-lucid opinion by a court.
Courts are not always able to state openly all of the considerations that affect their decisions.
Also, the Justices themselves are ultimately responsible for the decisions. These two factors may
have also added to the ambiguity in the Myrick decision. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 350-
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scope of Myrick, there was another that took a step backward, only
adding to confusion of the doctrine.
B. Applying (and Misapplying) Myrick
Just five months after Myrick was decided, a Washington lower
court applied it incorrectly. In State v. Crandall, Division III of the
Washington Court of Appeals upheld a warrantless search in which an
officer, based on a tip from a local hunter, trespassed twenty to fifty
feet onto the defendant's property, identified marijuana by looking
through a rifle scope and, without a warrant, trespassed onto the
defendant's property and seized a marijuana plant.68
After correctly identifying Myrick as the applicable law governing
the decision, the Crandall court concluded that while neither the Oliver
"open fields" test, nor the Katz reasonable expectation test were
dispositive by themselves, each served as "a factor" in concluding
whether the defendant's private affairs had been unreasonably intruded
upon.6 9 The court then determined that defendant's property "was
not an area in which one traditionally could reasonably expect privacy
S.. and therefore does not rise to a privacy interest held by the citizens
of this state."7"
In its brief analysis, the court made three errors in interpreting
Myrick. First, the court incorrectly stated that the Oliver "open fields"
test was a viable factor to be considered by the court.71 By definition,
a per se rule such as the "open fields" doctrine is either controlling or
it is not.72 While it is true that Myrick explained that the nature of
the property can be taken into account by the court,73 it is incorrect to
then assume that the per se "open fields" doctrine should serve as this
factor.
Second, the Crandall court determined that the Katz test was a
factor which the court should consider in determining whether an
individual's "private affairs" had been intruded upon.74 Since the
Myrick court expressly rejected the Katz test, there is no basis for this
conclusion.
68. 39 Wash. App. 849, 850-851, 697 P.2d 250, 252, review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1036
(1985).
69. See id. at 853-54, 697 P.2d at 253.
70. Id. at 854, 697 P.2d at 253.
71. See id.
72. Pregnancy serves as an example. One is either pregnant, or not. Similarly it is difficult
to see how a per se rule can be "a factor" of consideration.
73. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
74. See Crandall, 39 Wash. App. at 854, 697 P.2d 253.
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, in applying the second
prong of the Katz test and concluding that traditionally an individual
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this area,7" the
Crandall court failed to ask whether the defendant should be entitled
to hold a privacy interest in such property, as is required by Myrick.76
In 1986, just two years after Myrick, the Washington Supreme
Court spoke again with regard to Washington's unique search and
seizure jurisprudence. In two cases decided the same day, the court
both expanded and contracted Article I, section 7's notion of an
extended privacy right.
In the case State v. Gunwall,77 the court made two important
rulings. First, the court outlined six factors with which to decide
whether it was appropriate to resort to independent state constitutional
grounds in deciding a case, rather than to simply apply the federal
counterpart.7" Second, the court decided, in direct contradiction to
Smith v. Maryland,79 that police use of pen registers80 constituted a
search.81
In its reasoning, the court expressly rejected the assumption of
risk rationale that was presented in Katz, which stated, "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 2  In
federal cases after Katz, this sentence has been used to conclude that
telephone numbers exposed to the phone company are not private,
8 3
garbage exposed to garbage collectors and scavengers is not private, 4
and a person's travels exposed to disinterested members of the public
75. See id., 697 P.2d at 254.
76. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
77. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
78. See id. at 61, 702 P.2d at 812-13. These six factors, known as the "Gunwall factors"
include the following: (1) the textual language, (2) differences in the text, (3) constitutional
history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or
local concern.
79. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
80. A pen register is defined as "a mechanical device, usually installed at a central telephone
company facility, that records on paper the numbers dialed from a particular telephone by
monitoring the electronic impulses caused when the dial is rotated. Such a devise reveals only the
numbers that have been dialed." See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 63 n.15, 720 P.2d at 813 n.15
(citing Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of
Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 557, 558 n.3 (1980)).
81. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 68, 720 P.2d at 816.
82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
83. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
84. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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are not private." The Gunwall court responded, "It is unrealistic to
say that the cloak of privacy has been shed because the telephone
company and some of its employees are aware of this information
[numbers dialed from the defendant's telephone]." 6 The court then
created what it called a "limited-business purpose" exception to the
assumption of risk rationale. 7 While it was clear that the court
rejected the assumption of risk rationale, it remained to be seen how
narrowly it would define this "limited business purpose" exception.
Without adding any further indicia to its definition of "private
affairs," the court conclusively determined that in accordance with
Myrick and Article I, section 7, the use of the pen register did
constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's private
affairs. 8
8
While Myrick and Gunwall seem to bloom from the same seed,
State v. Stroud, 9 decided the same day as Gunwall, indicates a
diverging notion of Washington search and seizure jurisprudence.
In Stroud, the court partially agreed with the reasoning in New
York v. Belton,90 concluding that after a valid arrest the arresting
officer can conduct a warrantless search of the passenger department
of the defendant's automobile.91 This case overruled State v. Ringer
which had previously required an officer's finding of exigent circum-
stances before allowing such a warrantless search.92 While it is true
that Stroud did not directly contract the expanded definition of a search
that Myrick and Gunwall had advanced, the nature of the decision did
cause some confusion for lower courts in defining a search.
In crafting Stroud, the court expressed an interest in favoring a
bright line rule over the ad hoc totality of the circumstances test
implemented by Ringer.93 Note that in Myrick, the court rejected a
85. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding police use of a tracking device
attached to the defendant's car did not constitute a search since the defendant exposed his travels
to members of the public). Interestingly, Katz itself would be overruled if this language were
taken to its logical conclusion; because Katz exposed his conversation to the telephone operator,
he too could not claim Fourth Amendment protection. This idea is presented in Serr, infra note
156, at 626.
86. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 68, 720 P.2d at 816.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). Note that the court expressly indicated that
it was mindful of Michigan v. Long. Id. at 149, 720 P.2d at 439.
90. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (agreeing that an automobile exception should apply, however,
disagreeing as to where the line should be drawn).
91. See Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 150, 720 P.2d at 440.
92. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
93. See Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 151, 720 P.2d at 440.
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similar bright-line rule regarding "open fields," instead favoring an
analysis that required more of an ad hoc determination of a privacy
interest.94
Additionally, the concurring opinion in Stroud has provided a
great deal of confusion to some lower courts.9" In an opinion that
attempted to summarize the status of the law after Myrick, the
concurrence authored by Justice Durham misstated the court's
reasoning in Myrick. Justice Durham wrote,
Our state provision [Article I, section 7] appears to place a greater
emphasis than the Fourth Amendment on privacy interests. This
mandates that our court analyze search and seizure issues in terms
of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. This is an objective'reasonable man' standard, not a test of a person's subjective
expectation of privacy.96
Justice Durham incorrectly concluded that because Myrick expressly
rejected the subjective prong of the Katz test, the objective prong was
still the controlling test.9 7 Among the other problems associated with
the second, or "objective" prong of the Katz test,9 it notably fails to
address the "should be entitled to hold" language in Myrick. Justice
Durham overlooked the ingenuity of the Myrick decision, and offered
a hybrid test for lower courts in its place.
For the period of time after Stroud and prior to 1993, it appeared
that the Washington Supreme Court and some of the lower courts had
a sufficient handle on the fundamentals of Myrick, or at least were not
deciding opinions in direct opposition to these principles. In 1987, for
example, in State v. Butterworth, Division I of the Washington Court
of Appeals decided that the police acquisition of an unpublished
number from Pacific Northwest Bell constituted a search.99 The
Butterworth court specifically noted the defendant's request to keep his
94. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 157. Note that the "should be entitled
to hold" language of Myrick holding necessarily contradicts a bright-line test, requiring each court
to make an ad hoc conclusion as to what privacy interests citizens should be entitled to hold.
Even if the Myrick case only intended the "should" language to allow courts discretion, the
decision nonetheless mandates an ad hoc examination at some level.
95. See, e.g., State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583, 587-588, 740 P.2d 863, 867 (1987) ("It
is unclear after Myrick and Stroud whether the 2-prong expectation of privacy test developed by
the United States Supreme Court for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis is to be retained
under an [Article I, section 7] analysis.").
96. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 159, 720 P.2d at 445 (Durham, J., concurring).
97. Recognize that this was the same error that the Crandall court had made. See Crandall,
39 Wash. App. at 853-54, 697 P.2d at 253-54.
98. See discussion infra note 134, and accompanying text.
99. 48 Wash. App. 152, 737 P.2d 1297.(1987).
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number private, and cited Gunwall to illustrate that the defendant had
not assumed a risk of exposure simply because the telephone company
had the information.' 0
In 1990, the Washington Supreme Court, in direct opposition to
California v. Greenwood,'' decided State v. Boland, in which the
court recognized a protectable state privacy interest in a person's gar-
bage. ' 2 The Boland court rejected the assumption of risk notion in
Greenwood, applying a variant of the "limited-business exception" first
offered in Gunwall. °3 The court stated, "While a person must
reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remove the contents of
his trash can, this expectation does not also infer an expectation of
governmental intrusion.""
In 1993, however, this brief period of clarity ended. In a series
of cases both the Washington Supreme Court and the lower courts
began backing away from the picture of Myrick and Article I, section
7, that had begun to take focus.
In State v. Faydo, Division III of the Washington Court of
Appeals determined that the police did not violate the defendant's
Article I, section 7 rights in obtaining the address of the defendant
through the billing records of U.S. West Communications.' 5 The
Faydo court concluded that such activity did not constitute a search
since, "In this day and age in which private businesses routinely sell
customer lists to other businesses, it is unreasonable to believe
customer's name and the names of others he lists at his residence for
billing purposes will be kept private."106
Faydo directly contradicts the language of Myrick which warns
that the definition of private affairs must not turn on citizens'
diminished expectations of privacy.107 Based on Myrick, the Faydo
100. See id. at 156-57, 737 P.2d at 1301.
101. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
102. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 574, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990). For a detailed discussion of
State v. Boland, see Jennison, supra note 20.
103. Greenwood was based in part on the United States Supreme Court's belief that it was
objectively unreasonable to hold a privacy interest in garbage left outside the curtilage of the
home; and, in using a Smith v. Maryland analogy, also unreasonable to maintain privacy in
something one exposed to a host of people including trashmen, children, scavengers, etc. See
Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 580-81, 800 P.2d at 1116-17.
104. Id. at 581, 800 P.2d at 1117. Of course, by concluding that an individual does hold
a reasonable privacy interest in his trash even though he has exposed it to the trash collector, the
Court did not reach the question of whether or not the individual should be entitled to hold that
privacy interest even if it were an unreasonable belief.
105. 68 Wash. App. 621, 623, 846 P.2d 539, 540 (1993).
106. Id. at 625, 846 P.2d at 541.
107. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
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court should have asked whether this was a private affair for which
Washington citizens should be protected. The court could have come
to the same conclusion, upholding the search, without having to decide
that such activity did not constitute a private affair.'
The next year, in State v. Young, the Washington Supreme Court
took a noteworthy step in defining a search.'09 While the Young
holding was in line with Myrick and its progeny, its reasoning can be
interpreted as being a step away from this line of cases. The Young
Court determined that the police use of infrared surveillance to identify
abnormal heating patterns inside the defendant's home, normally
indicative of a marijuana grow, constituted a search." 0
Included in the Young opinion, however, was the following
language: "[W]hat is voluntarily exposed to the general public and
observable without the use of enhancement devices from an unprotect-
ed area is not considered part of a person's private affairs.""' This
"voluntary exposure" language has been interpreted as being synony-
mous with Katz's "knowing exposure," or assumption of risk no-
tion."' Gunwall,"3  Butterworth"4  and Boland,"s however, all
reject such a comparison.
The court later misinterpreted this language from Young in State
v. Goucher, holding that the defendant waived his right to privacy by
voluntarily engaging in a conversation with a detective who answered
the defendant's telephone call during a lawful search of a suspected
drug dealer's home." 6 The Goucher court noted that the defendant
had a conversation with an acknowledged stranger, yet failed to
identify exactly how that differed from Gunwall giving phone numbers
108. Compare this case with State v. Butterworth, in which the court said that the defendant
did not waive his right to privacy simply because he exposed the information to the phone
company. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. at 159, 737 P.2d at 1301. While it is true that in
Butterworth the defendant specifically asked that his phone number not be listed, in Faydo, there
was no similar option for individuals attempting to keep their addresses private from the billing
department. See Faydo, 68 Wash. App. at 624, 846 P.2d at 541.
109. 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). For a detailed discussion of this case, see
Michael Suga, Comment, State v. Young and the New Test for Privacy in Washington, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 907 (1995); see also Melinda Foster, Comment, State v. Young: A Cool View Towards
Infrared Thermal-Detection Devices, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 135 (1994).
110. See Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
111. Id. at 182-83, 867 P.2d 597-98.
112. See State v. Goucher, 124 Wash. 2d 778, 784, 881 P.2d 210, 213 (1994).
113. 106 Wash. 2d at 63-64, 720 P.2d at 813-14.
114. 48 Wash. App. at 154-55, 737 P.2d 1298-99.
115. 115 Wash. 2d at 580-81, 800 P.2d at 1116-17 (1990).
116. 124 Wash. 2d at 782, 881 P.2d at 212 (1994).
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to a stranger at the phone company or Boland giving the trash to a
stranger with a garbage truck.
117
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals took the Goucher
decision one step further in State v. Gonzales, holding that an officer
who was lawfully conducting a search of the defendant's home did not
violate Article I, section 7, when he answered defendant's tele-
phone.' The court reasoned that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the incoming call with regard to
persons lawfully on his premises.119 The Gonzales court was clearly
applying the second prong of the Katz test, ignoring Myrick's question
of whether or not the defendant should be entitled to hold such affairs
as private.
C. Lower Courts' Expressed Confusion Over Myrick
The types of errors springing from Myrick were varied. Many of
the aforementioned courts simply applied the second prong of
Katz.12 Other courts implemented Oliver's "open fields" doctrine as
a factor for consideration.'21 Some examined the assumption of risk
notion presented in Katz.'22 In addition, most courts have notably
ignored the "should be entitled to hold" language of Myrick.23
Based upon these diverging applications of Myrick, it is no wonder that
two divisions of the Court of Appeals expressly voiced their confusion
in defining a search in accordance with Washington law.
As early as 1987, Division III recognized the ambiguity left in the
wake of Myrick. In State v. Berber, the court wrote,
It is unclear after Myrick and Stroud whether the 2-prong expecta-
tion of privacy test developed by the U.S. Supreme Court for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis is to be retained under art.
I, § 7 analysis. In the absence of any clear indication from the
Washington Supreme Court as to the applicability of the federal
117. See id. at 784, 881 P.2d at 213.
118. 78 Wash. App. 976, 984-85, 900 P.2d 564, 568-69 (1995).
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Gonzales,
78 Wash. App. 976, 900 P.2d 564 (1995); State v. Crandall, 39 Wash. App. 849, 697 P.2d 250
(1985).
121. See, e.g., Crandall, 39 Wash. App. at 853-54, 697 P.2d at 253.
122. See, e.g., State v. Faydo, 68 Wash. App. 621, 846 P.2d 383 (1983).
123. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (Durham, J.,
concurring).
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test, we will analyze search and seizure issues with reference to that
test.12
4
Interestingly, in spite of such a clear call for assistance, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court denied review of the case. 121
Division III, however, was not alone in expressing its confusion.
In 1989, Division I made its own cry for help in City of Tukwila v.
Nalder.'26  The court cited the language of Myrick, then cited the
confusion expressed by Division III in Berber, and finally added,
"Assuming that the federal test yields no less restrictive guidelines that
[sic] those required by our Const. art. I, § 7, we analyze Nalder's
privacy right accordingly."'
27
From the path of the law in this area, it is clear that confusion still
exists as to exactly how Myrick and its progeny define a search in
accordance with Article I, section 7. For this reason, the following
proposal attempts to embody the language and intent of the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's most recent expressions in defining a search
pursuant to the Washington Constitution.
IV. PROPOSAL
When faced with a case requiring the court to determine whether
or not a search has taken place, the court should expressly ask the
following three questions:
1. Is it appropriate for this court to resort to state constitu-
tional grounds to decide this case?
(a) Is there a preexisting state law in this area?
(b) Is this a matter of particular state interest?
2. Did the state intrude upon what has been, or should be
considered an individual's "private affairs"?
3. Did the individual waive his or her right to privacy by
displaying these private affairs to any curious, but not obtrusive,
member of the public not employed in the collection of such affairs?
A. Origins of the Proposed Test
Prong one of the proposed test comes directly from factors four
and six outlined in Gunwall.28 The Washington Supreme Court has
124. 48 Wash. App. 583, 587-88, 740 P.2d 863, 867 (internal citations omitted), review
denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1014 (1987).
125. See State v. Berber, 109 Wash. 2d 1014 (1987).
126. 53 Wash. App. 746, 770 P.2d 670 (1989).
127. Id. at 750, 770 P.2d at 673.
128. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 66-69, 720 P.2d at 815 (factor four is preexisting state
law; factor six is matters of particular state or local concern). For a detailed explanation of these
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officially and consistently noted that these two factors comprise the
total relevant inquiry in deciding whether or not a case is to be decided
on state or federal constitutional grounds.'29 Note that in cases
where factors four and six were not met, the court felt free to decide
the merits on federal grounds. 30
The language from prong two of the proposed test comes directly
from Myrick. By and large, this was the test Myrick asked courts to
apply in determining whether a search had taken place. There are,
however, two important differences between prong two of the proposed
test and the Myrick test. First, unlike the language of Myrick, the
above proposal has eliminated the word "unreasonably" before the
word "intrude."'' The proposal relies upon prong three to deter-
mine whether the intrusion was reasonable. This bifurcation enables
a court to conclude affirmatively that an individual's private affairs
were intruded upon, yet still conclude that such an intrusion was
reasonable.'32
Second, it is important to recognize that the "should" language of
Myrick appears directly in prong two, lest it not be forgotten. This
language was overlooked by many of the lower courts,'33 probably
because it was buried in the Myrick court's discussion rather than
appearing in the test itself.134 By emphasizing this language, courts
may be less apt to overlook it.
One aspect that prong two of the proposed test does not change
about the original Myrick test is the ambiguity of the term "private
affair." The term is left intentionally broad to allow courts to use the
second prong simply as a threshold determination."'
two factors, see Davis, supra note 5, at 1347 and 1348-49.
129. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996); State v. Boland,
115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 571 (1990); Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 834 P.2d 73
(1992).
130. See, e.g., State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. 103, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993); State v.
Wojtyna, 70 Wash. App. 689, 855 P.2d 315 (1993).
131. The Myrick court asked, "whether the state has unreasonably intruded into the
defendant's 'private affairs.'' Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 154 (emphasis added).
132. See discussion, infra note 152, for the advantage of such bifurcation.
133. See, e.g., discussion of Gonzales and Faydo supra Part III.2.B.
134. In Myrick, the court explicitly stated, "the relevant inquiry for determining when a
search has occurred is whether the State unreasonably intruded into the defendant's 'private
affairs."' 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 154. It is only at the end of that paragraph that the
court adds the important "should" language. Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
135. For guidance, a definition of "private affairs" was offered in a recent University of
Washington Law Review article as cited in State v. Goucher, 124 Wash. 2d 778, 784, 881 P.2d
210, 213 (1994) as follows: "A 'private affairs' interest may be defined as a matter or object
personal to an individual such that intruding upon it would offend a reasonable person." (citing
James W. Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution,
1997]
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Prong three of the proposed test is where the true determination
of reasonability lies. It is an attempt to reconcile two competing
interests that are inherent in defining a search. On the one hand, it is
imperative that individuals be allowed to function normally in society
without being forced to waive all notions of privacy." If every
interaction with the public constitutes a waiver of such privacy,
individuals will ultimately be forced to live a life of complete isolation
in order to retain any privacy interests.'37 On the other hand,
individuals should not be allowed to claim "privacy-immunity" for that
which they willingly display to any curious member of the public. 3 '
Prong three attempts to reconcile this problem. While it is true that
an individual should not be allowed to waive the white flag of privacy
to shield an affair he publicizes boldly throughout the community,
neither should an individual be penalized for performing normal daily
functions such as using the telephone, taking out the trash, or driving
around the neighborhood. 9
In an attempt to take these competing concerns into consideration,
prong three of the proposed test offers a solution. The individual
needs to take enough precautions to protect the private affair from a
curious member of the public, but need not anticipate shielding such
an affair from the obtrusive viewer. 40 Indeed, the individual need
66 WASH. L. REv. 1099, 1113 (1991)).
136. The idea of ensuring that citizens function normally in society comes from Gunwall
and Boland. In Gunwall, the court agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court which stated that
a telephone "is a personal and business necessity indispensable to one's ability to effectively
communicate in today's complex society." 106 Wash. 2d at 67, 720 P.2d at 815 (1986) (citing
People v. Sporleder, 666 P.24 135, 141 (Colo. 1983)). In Boland, the Court stated, "The proper
and regulated collection of garbage... is as necessary to the proper functioning of modern society
as is the telephone company." 115 Wash. 2d at 581, 800 P.2d at 1117.
137. This idea was presented by Professor Amsterdam, who asked whether the assumption
of risk rationale in Katz required individuals, in attempting to preserve privacy, to "[R]etir[e] to
the cellar, cloak[] all the windows with thick caulking, turn[] off the lights and remain[] absolutely
quiet." Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 402.
138. So while the Washington Supreme Court considers it important that an individual feel
free to leave his or her trash on the curb to be picked up by the trash collector and still retain his
or her right to keep the contents of his or her garbage private, he or she cannot claim the same
privacy protection when he or she spreads his or her trash all over his or her front lawn. See
Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 574, 800 P.2d at 1114; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
139. Using Boland and Greenwood as an example: a person who places his trash on the curb
in a nontransparent bag, with the bag closed, cannot be said to have waived his right to privacy.
Spreading the trash on the lawn, using a dear bag, or even failing to close the bag, would,
however, constitute a waiver since the individual did not protect the affairs from a curious
member of the public.
140. An example may help clarify the distinction. If an individual was interested in keeping
activities on his front lawn private, erecting a chain-link fence around his yard would not protect
against the curious passerby, while constructing a six-foot high wall around the yard would protect
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not combat nor even anticipate the obtrusive to retain his notion of
privacy. Rather, he or she need only shield the affair from the mere
curious. This, then, would also serve as the standard for police
conduct. Police officers would be guided by the notion that they can
act as any curious member of the public, so long as their conduct does
not cross the line of obtrusiveness."'
This idea of equating a police officer's conduct with that of
curious but not obtrusive citizens comes, in part, from State v.
Rose. 142  In Rose, the Washington Supreme Court held that an
officer's observations with the aid of a flashlight through an unob-
structed window did not constitute a search. The court concluded that
"[a]n officer may act as any reasonably respectful citizen. . . . A
resident who leaves unobstructed a window immediately to the left of
the front entrance should expect that reasonably respectful persons will
look in, even if just out of curiosity. ' 143 As the aforementioned
language indicates, the court is concerned with whether the defendant
against such an intrusion. While it is the curious passerby who looks through the chain-link
fence, it is only the obtrusive who scales the wall, climbs an adjacent tree, or flies above the area
to get a view. As such, with the wall in place, the individual's lawn remains a private affair
without the need to post a guard atop the wall, chop down adjacent trees or construct a roof over
the lawn.
141. This is not, of course, as concrete a standard as a per se rule, such as the "open fields"
doctrine. For a discussion of this criticism of the proposal see infra note 142, and accompanying
text.
142. 128 Wash. 2d 388, 909 P.2d 280 (1996). Outside of Rose, the notion of determining
the appropriateness of police activity based upon the activities of citizens in general was stated by
Melvin Gutterman. See Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647
(1988). Gutterman discussed Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S 319 (1979), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held, "The government could view the magazines and films only as any other
member of the public ordinarily would .. .." Id. at 684. In addition, Michael Campbell
proposed a standard by which the court defined a federal search in reference to a social norms of
privacy standard. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 212. Under such a standard the court would
determine whether the government's conduct would be socially acceptable if engaged in by a
private citizen. See id. Such a standard, however, fails to account for circumstances when the
police engaged in conduct that is unavailable to citizens, such as in the case of infrared thermo-
detection devices used by police in State v. Young. The article proposed handling such cases by
analogy. Id.
Prong three of the proposed test differs from this standard since it only asks if the defendant
waived his or her privacy right by displaying the affair to the curious citizen. Use of such devises
unavailable to citizens in general would thereby qualify as obtrusive behavior. Cf. Scott Sundby,
"Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994) (discussing the loss of
trust that takes place between the government and the citizen when an illegal search takes place).
In addition, prong three differs from the current test in that it focuses on the norms of trust
between two citizens. Accordingly, in prong three, the government trust is, in fact, defined by
that trust which exists between citizens.
143. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d at 396, 909 P.2d at 285.
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took action in protecting his private affairs from the curious.'44 In
Rose, by not pulling the blinds, the answer was "no," and thus the
officer's conduct did not rise to the level of a search.
While the Rose court used the term "reasonably respectful
citizen," such a standard may be a bit misleading in its application.
Even under the facts of Rose, it would be difficult to conclude that a
reasonably respectful citizen would approach an unobstructed window
of a stranger's home and shine a flashlight into it. Since the court is
ultimately concerned with what the curious member of the public
would do, prong three proposes the "curious, but not obtrusive"
standard.'45
The last part of prong three of the proposed test, "member of the
public not employed in the collection of such affairs," also draws a
separate distinction between those individuals in society whose job it
is to collect what may be defined as private affairs versus general
members of the public.' 46 This clause stems, in part, from Gunwall's
notion of a "limited-business exception" to Katz's assumption of risk
rationale.'47 Citizens employed in the collection of the private affairs
cannot be equated with run-of-the-mill curious members of the general
public. If no distinction is drawn, individuals could not hand
postcards to their mail carrier, or cash checks in front of their bank
teller without first waiving their right to keep those affairs private from
curious citizens. Put another way, some basic functions in society
mandate disclosure of private affairs to specific citizens whose job
144. Further indication of the court's rationale can be seen in a contrast the court drew in
articulating the facts of Rose. The court stated, "In contrast, where the window through which
an officer looked was eight feet from the fire escape and well out of view of anyone engaged in
normal use of the fire escape, the officer's view through the window was a search." Id. at 396 n.3,
909 P.2d at 397 n.3 (citations omitted). Note that the court was discussing normal usage of the
fire escape by an average citizen further solidifying the comparison of an officer to a normal; albeit
curious, but nonobtrusive member of the public.
145. Incidentally, it is not entirely clear that the activity in Rose would not qualify as
obtrusive. This only indicates that the "curious, but not obtrusive" standard is, of course, subject
to interpretation.
146. This includes garbage collectors, bank tellers, postal employees, phone company
employees, etc. The term "employed" should not be implied to mean that volunteers or other
individuals who do not receive compensation do not qualify.
147. In addition, this idea was also cultivated by Gutterman, who notes, "Risking
observation by a limited category of persons is not equivalent of 'public exposure' . . . ."
Gutterman, supra note 142, at 685. This notion was extended in Boland and Butterworth as well.




requires them to be "curious."14 Such limited disclosures should not
constitute a waiver of an individual's private affairs.
B. How the Proposed Test Would Assist Washington Courts
The proposed test would be of great use to Washington courts.
Primarily, the proposed test would serve to unify many of the existing,
albeit somewhat scattered, principles of jurisprudence defining a search
as articulated by the Washington Supreme Court. The test would
provide more predictability and guidance for lower courts.
As cases emerge, the courts would further define the line between
curious and obtrusive behavior. Ultimately this would provide police
officers with a notion of which activity constitutes a search and thereby
requires a warrant and which activity qualifies simply as being a
curious observation, not amounting to a search.
The test would also help bring the "should" language of Myrick
into effect. There is no Washington case in which a court has said
that while in the past citizens of the state have not held a certain affair
private, we find that they should be entitled to hold it as such. The
ingenuity of the Myrick decision, however, is that it specifically allows
such a decision. As technology advances and reasonable notions of
privacy diminish, it will be this "should" language that allows the
court to step in and carve out that which the Washington Constitution
should protect as sacred.149
Additionally, the proposed test offers the courts a more intuitive
definition of privacy. Prong two isolates the question of whether
something qualifies as a private affair. This is a different inquiry from
prong three which determines whether the private affair was unreason-
ably intruded upon. By bifurcating the Myrick test, which had
previously joined the two inquiries, the court need not speak with its
tongue in its cheek. Under the current test, for a court to conclude
that police activity did not rise to the level of a search, it must first
determine that no private affair was intruded upon. Such a broad
statement, however, leads to confusion when the facts suggest police
activity within a zone or medium traditionally associated with privacy
(for example, a home or telephone call). For instance, in Florida v.
Riley, the Court held that a warrantless aerial surveillance above the
defendant's greenhouse was not a search because a police officer was
148. By this I mean, the mail carrier needs to look at the postcard to see where to send it,
just as the bank teller needs to authorize the check before cashing it.
149. The ingenuity of the "should" language is described in Sundby, supra note 142, at
1760-61.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
able to see through an opening in the greenhouse roof and side, even
though the entire greenhouse was shielded from ground level observa-
tion by trees and shrubs.' The Court further held that the defen-
dant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of the greenhouse due to the openings in the roof and sides.'
By bifurcating the question of whether something qualifies as a
private affair, and whether the intrusion constitutes a search, the
proposed test would allow courts to apply a more realistic definition of
privacy, without being forced into such awkward alternatives. The
advantage of the bifurcated test, therefore, is that it would allow courts
to find that while something may qualify as a private affair (under
prong two), the state intrusion upon it may be reasonable (pursuant to
prong three),152
It is important to note that had the Washington Supreme Court
implemented this proposed test in Myrick, many of the subsequent
cases would have come out differently. In fact, had the court applied
the proposed test to the Myrick decision itself, it too would have had
a different holding.5 3
Assuming that prong one of the proposed test is satisfied,"5 4
prong two asks whether Myrick's field has qualified, or should qualify,
as a private affair. Using prong two merely as a threshold require-
ment, it seems clear that a citizen's property tucked away from public
exposure should constitute a private affair. Examining prong three, the
question is thus: did Myrick waive his right to privacy by displaying
150. 488 U.S 445 (1989).
151. See id. at 448. Note that the greenhouse was well within the curtilage of the home.
152. For example, in Gonzales, the court could have said that while the defendant did have
a privacy interest in his incoming telephone calls, the state intrusion was justified for some other
reason. See Gonzales, 78 Wash. App. at 984-85, 900 P.2d at 568-69. In Faydo, the court could
have said that while the defendant did have a privacy interest in his address that he gave only for
billing purposes to the phone company, the search was justified for another reason. See Faydo,
68 Wash. App. at 623, 846 P.2d at 540. Without the bifurcated test, however, the court was
forced into the awkward position of claiming that neither the incoming calls nor the information
qualify as private affairs, rather than simply explaining that while they may be private, the
respective searches were justified for other reasons.
153. Ironically, had the court in Katz applied the "assumption of risk" rationale in Katz,
it too would have forced the opposite holding. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 7. Namely,
because Katz was exposing his conversation to a third party (the telephone operator), he no longer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his words. Indeed, had Smith v. Maryland preceded
Katz, this may very well have been the result.
154. For purposes of this examination, prong one, which is the application of Gunwall
factors four and six, will not be discussed. Note, however, that this should not imply that prong
one is a nonentity, for indeed the Washington courts have used Gunwall to preclude state
discussion. See State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. 103, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993); State v. Wojytina,
70 Wash. App. 689, 855 P.2d 315 (1993) (both cases failed the Gunwall threshold test).
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his land to any curious but not obtrusive member of the public?
Looking at the facts of Myrick, the court noted several indicia of
Myrick's attempts to keep his land free from curious onlookers: a
fence, several no trespassing signs, electronic sensors, and a platform
to detect intruders. 5 Using the proposed test, it appears that
Myrick satisfied his duty of protecting his land from the curious
onlooker, rendering the officer's action obtrusive.'56
The Faydo case provides yet another example of how the proposed
test would reach a different result. In Faydo, the defendant listed his
name and phone number, but not his address in the telephone
directory.' The officer was able to receive the defendant's address
through the billing records of U.S. West Communications.
5 8
Assuming that prongs one and two of the proposed test are satisfied,
the relevant inquiry under prong three is whether the defendant waived
his right to keep his address private by displaying it to any curious but
not obtrusive person not employed at the phone company. Here it is
clear that the defendant did not make such a waiver. By asking that
his address not appear in the telephone directory, the defendant
sufficiently guarded his address from the curious. As such, the
officer's activities should have been considered a search.
The Crandall case provides an interesting comparison with
Myrick, with ultimately the same conclusion. Crandall's land was
adjacent to a known hunting area, and while the property was bordered
by a single strand of wire, there were no signs instructing hunters to
keep out.'59 The police officer, unable to get a view of the property
from behind the border, crossed the wire and used a rifle scope to see
the marijuana plants growing on Crandall's land. 6° Under the
proposed test, the relevant inquiry persuant to prong three is whether
Crandall waived his right to privacy by exposing his land to any
curious, but not obtrusive, member of the public. While Crandall did
not erect signs or use electronic sensors, he did mark and border his
155. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
156. It is true that Myrick did not build a roof over his property, and so technically he did
not protect his property from the curious person flying above his land. The proposed test does
not require such activity, however, since it is only the obtrusive viewer who deliberately flies over
the defendant's property dose enough to see the type of crops growing, or who uses visual
enhancement devises to see the same. The curious casual observer in the air offers no significant
threat to privacy. See Brian Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 615 (1989).
157. See Faydo, 68 Wash. App. 621, 846 P.2d 383 (1983).
158. See id.
159. See Crandall, 39 Wash. App. at 849, 697 P.2d at 250 at 850-51.
160. See id. at 850, 697 P.2d at 252.
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land with wire. Had the officer merely stood at the wire and looked
in with the rifle scope, that activity could be properly seen as curious.
Crossing the wire, however, probably enters more into the realm of the
obtrusive. While it is certainly debatable under the proposed test, the
Crandall court should have deemed the officer's activity a search.
C. Counterarguments
As the Crandall case illustrates, the demarcation between
sufficiently protecting against the curious onlooker and waiving a right
to privacy is not always well defined. This, however, is to be expected.
As Mr. Justice Holmes once commented, "[w]henever the law draws
a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides."16'
While it is true that the proposed test requires something more than
simply plugging numbers into a formulaic equation, it is not as
amorphous or elusive as the Myrick "test" it would replace. What the
test lacks in its definitions of "curious" or "obtrusive," it makes up for
in its uniformity of application in lower courts' rediscovery of Myrick's
"should" language, and its ability to provide intuitive definitions of
privacy.
Washington citizens may argue that the proposed test unfairly
requires affirmative action on their part to maintain a right already
afforded to them in Article I, section 7. This is incorrect. The careful
wording of prong three only asks whether the individual waived his or
her constitutional right to this privacy. Note that this is different than
asking whether the individual did all he could do in protecting his right
to privacy.'62 While this may seem to be simply an issue of seman-
tics, according to the wording of the proposal, the individual is
presumed to start with the privacy right, and need only avoid shedding
the right by disclosure.
One commentator has argued that accidental disclosure of a
private affair should not qualify as a waiver of privacy.163 Prong
three, however, does not probe into the individual's thought process in
displaying the private affair. In strict liability terminology, even
accidental disclosure of the private affair to the curious would
constitute a waiver under prong three.
161. As cited in Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 388.
162. This is the standard that one commentator has proposed. See William McAninch,
Unreasonable Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment, 20 STETSON L. REV.
435, 471 (1991).
163. See Lewis Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND.
L. J. 549, 573-75 (1990) (commenting on the Katz "assumption of risk" language).
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It is difficult to see what advantage a knowledge requirement
would add to the rule. Should such a provision be added, police
officers would be burdened with (1) not only deciding if their
surveillance borders on the curious or obtrusive, but (2) also attempt-
ing to inquire into the defendant's thought process in making the
private affair public. While the police officer will hopefully be guided
by common sense and case law with regard to the former, the latter
requires an advanced degree in mind reading. A knowledge require-
ment would frustrate the applicability of such a standard.
Finally, some may disagree with the premise underlying prong
three; namely, that the government may only act in a manner
commensurate with a member of the curious public. The argument is
as follows: It is the job of the police to ferret out and control crime.
To perform this function, it is sometimes necessary to pry into people's
private affairs. Because the police have more of a legitimate interest in
prying into private affairs than do individual citizens, the police should
not be held to the same standard as everyday citizens.
164
This argument fails to account for the fact that, by itself, prong
three does not limit the government's ability to perform a search.
Prong three of the proposed test merely decides whether the prying can
occur with or without a warrant, depending on whether or not the
activity constitutes a search. By equating police activity with that of
a curious citizen, prong three does not curtail government activities per
se.
VI. CONCLUSION
One commentator notes that as society has advanced, privacy has
become more and more of a limited commodity. 161 In accordance
with the Katz test, the less privacy citizens expect from the govern-
ment, the less the government needs to afford. 166  Washington,
164. This argument is made explicitly in Campbell, supra note 6, at 210.
165. Sundby, supra note 142, at 1759-60.
166. Through well publicized advances in technology, the government can advise citizens
to expect a minimum level of privacy. Because citizens expect little privacy from the government,
the test would afford little privacy. See Gutterman, supra note 142, at 676. If, for example, the
government posted a sign next to every telephone which read, "your conversation is being
recorded and may be monitored by your local police station," not only would it be unrealistic for
an individual to have a subjective expectation of privacy, but objectively it would be unreasonable
as well. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 384; Gutterman, supra note 142.
This is exactly where the "should" language of the Myrick test and the proposal come into
play. Prong two of the proposed test asks whether such activity should be considered private. See
Sundby, supra note 142, at 1760. In response to the above hypothetical, a court could legitimately
say that even though it would not be reasonable to expect the conversation to be private under
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however, has recognized the danger of such a system. Myrick was a
bold step in articulating and defining new search and seizure jurispru-
dence for Washington citizens. Unfortunately, the Myrick court did
not go far enough in offering a concrete test to take the place of the
rejected Katz two-prong test. The proposal serves to fill this void,
sewing together scraps of noteworthy advances made both in Myrick,
and in many of the cases that followed its lead. While expectations of
privacy continue to fall with each new advance in surveillance
technology, by adopting the proposed test the state of Washington can
offer its citizens a make-shift shelter under which they may attain
protection.
those conditions, the call should be considered a private affair, and is therefore eligible for
protection (assuming the caller does not yell into the phone, or in some other way waive his
privacy right under prong three analysis).
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